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The issue of immigrant spatial concentration and dispersion through migration features 
in several interrelated debates. Spatial assimilation theory links immigrant relocation 
away from residential enclaves to socioeconomic gains. Although framed at an intra-
urban scale, we suggest that similar assimilation logics infuse thinking on immigrant 
settlement and mobility at other scales. Additionally, immigrant clustering links to 
anxieties about the threats posed by non-European origin newcomers. Research on 
immigrant settlement geography and spatial mobility has so far been restricted to the first 
generation. This paper investigates the migration behavior of the growing population of 
adult children of immigrants, specifically the 1.5 generation, seeking to answer the 
question of whether they will remain in the states in which their parent’s generation 
settled or move on. It also assesses whether the out-migration response of the 1.5 
generation in states of immigrant concentration is similar to that of their parent’s 
generation or the US-born population. 
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The issue of immigrant spatial concentration and dispersion through migration features in 
several interrelated debates.  Spatial assimilation theory links immigrant relocation away from 
residential enclaves to socioeconomic gains. Although framed at an intra-urban scale, we 
suggest that similar assimilation logics infuse thinking on immigrant settlement and mobility at 
other scales. Additionally, immigrant clustering links to anxieties about the threats posed by 
non-European origin newcomers.  Research on immigrant settlement geography and spatial 
mobility has so far been restricted to the first generation. This paper investigates the migration 
behavior of the growing population of adult children of immigrants, specifically the 1.5 
generation, seeking to answer the question of whether they will remain in the states in which 
their parent’s generation settled or move on.  It also assesses whether the out-migration 
response of the 1.5 generation in states of immigrant concentration is similar to that of their 




One of the distinctive features of contemporary immigration to the US is that the foreign-
born population concentrates in a handful of states (e.g. US Census Bureau 2000).  Whilst there 
is some indication of a shift in this pattern to new destination states in the south and west (e.g. 
Singer 2004), the vast majority of the children of immigrants, both 1.5 and 2
nd generation, are 
coming of age in a limited number of traditional gateway states, most notably California, New 
York, Texas and Florida.  How these descendents of the current wave of immigration will fare 
in America’s post-industrial economy, with its ever-widening gap between rich and poor, is the 
rightful subject of much debate among scholars of immigration.  Surrounding this issue is the 
important question of location: will the adult children of immigrants be content to stay in the 
states and localities in which their parent’s generation settled or will they move on to greener 
pastures to stake their claim to the American dream?  In this paper we begin to answer this 
question through an analysis of the interstate migration of the adult 1.5 generation. 
Despite early prognoses that the children of immigrants would decline into an urban 
underclass (Gans 1992, Massey 1995, Portes and Zhou 1995), more recent investigations have 
cautiously surmised they will surpass the educational and occupational attainments of their 
parents (Hirschman 2001, Zhou 2001, Farley and Alba 2002).  Such assessments note the 
complications of race and nativity, however, stressing that intergenerational progress will be 
slower for some racial and nativity groups than others.  In so doing, there is continuing 
reference to segmented assimilation hypotheses with their claim that immigrant adaptation is 
contingent upon race and context of settlement (Rosenbaum and Friedman 2001).  However, 
with the exception of Zhou’s (2001) findings that second generation occupational and   2
educational progress depends on urban context, there has been little empirical consideration of 
the ways in which location might matter for the children of immigrants. 
This is doubly curious given the historical preoccupation of immigration research with 
immigrants’ mobility and settlement patterns, and the focus on the role of distinctive ethnic 
communities in immigrant assimilation.  It seems that interrogation of the geography and spatial 
mobility of later generations would be of interest in three regards.  First, the neighborhood 
integration of immigrants and the US-born has been a continuing focus of spatial assimilation 
research (Massey 1985; Massey and Denton 1988; Alba, Logan, and Crowder 1997; Alba, 
Logan et al 1999), one that could be easily extended to the residential patterns of the adult 
children of immigrants.  Second, concern at a regional level with the territorial politics of 
immigrant mobility and settlement would seem to necessitate questions of where subsequent 
generations live as well (Frey 1995, 1996; Ellis and Wright 1998; Wright and Ellis 2001).  
Third, internal migration has traditionally been an important condition for socio-economic 
advancement in America’s geographically mobile society.  In the 1980s for example, annual 
mobility rates in the United States were approximately double those found in Europe and Japan, 
a difference frequently attributed to the relative openness of housing and labor markets in the 
US (Long 1988, 1991).  On first blush, it seems likely that the socio-economic progress of the 
adult children of US immigrants will be influenced by these same deregulated market 
conditions, facilitating their migration away from centers of immigration.  
This paper explores the empirical foundations for these arguments by focusing on the 
interstate migration behavior of the adult 1.5 generation, defined as immigrants who arrive in 
the US under 10 years of age.  The 1.5 generation is a group for whom we have sufficiently 
large samples for an in-depth analysis of migration behavior relative to two key comparison 
groups: first generation immigrants and the US-born.  In particular, two questions underpin the   3
analysis.  Does the internal migration behavior of the 1.5 generation resemble that of the US-
born population or is it more like that of the adult foreign-born?  And are 1.5 generation adults 
leaving the regions of the country where their parents settled?  Answers to these questions will 
reveal the extent to which the adult children of immigrants are moving away from states of 
immigration, and whether their migration responses to origin economic and social conditions is 
like that of the US-born as might be expected under a process of assimilation. 
 
Space, Migration and Immigrant Incorporation in the US 
The geography and spatial mobility of the foreign-born have been important features of 
debates about immigrant wellbeing and incorporation in the United States for well over a 
century. One of the earliest statements on this subject is by Jacob Riis’ (1890) in his famous 
expose of poverty in New York, How the Other Half Lives.  When he colorfully suggested that 
“a map of the city, colored to designate nationalities, would show more stripes than on the skin 
of the zebra and more colors than the rainbow” he invoked a link between immigrant 
concentration and deprivation that persists to this day (Riis 1890:20). Pro and anti-immigrant 
advocates in the next three decades argued back and forth about whether immigration problems 
were simply a matter of insufficient geographical dispersion from ports of entry and select 
industrial cities where immigrants clustered (e.g. Hall 1907, Warne 1916).  And although these 
arguments were often couched in terms of economic efficiency and aiding the process of 
cultural absorption, questions of the threat posed by spatial concentrations of “others” in 
America’s cities were not far from the surface.  Some nineteenth century nativists went as far as 
to conclude that America’s largest cities contained the two biggest threats to their idealized 
Jeffersonian nation: industrialization and alien labor (Higham 1988).  US resident Jewish 
groups were so sensitive to issues of clustering that they actively tried to disperse newly arrived   4
Eastern European Jews from urban ghettos for fear that mass spatial concentration would stoke 
the fires of American anti-Semitism (Glazier 1998). 
Contemporary debates about immigrant concentration contain more than a faint echo of 
these arguments.  At the scale of states and regions, assertions of “flight” from areas of 
immigration and ensuing “demographic balkanization” conjure up images of unbridgeable 
cultural fissures between immigrant groups who hail largely from Asia and Latin America and 
US-born whites (Frey 1995, 1996; cf Ellis and Wright 1998).   Although these claims predate 
Samuel Huntington’s (2004) most recent incendiary book, it is this work which most clearly 
articulates an anxiety about how immigrant cultural diversity, specifically that supplied by 
Latinos, is eroding the cultural foundations of the Anglo-American mainstream.  His earlier 
book, The Clash of Civilizations (1997), also spoke of these ideas, predicting conflict not only 
between cultures outside the US but also within it.  In particular, Clash includes a map of US 
counties in which the US Census projects non-white majorities in the first few decades of the 
twenty-first century (a largely contiguous belt of counties in the West and Southwest).  In 
Huntington’s view, it is the map’s projection of regional clusters of non-white dominance which 
raises alarm bells about immigration’s effect on the cohesiveness of the nation. 
In less inflammatory fashion, contemporary immigration scholars have spilled much ink 
arguing over the form of ethnic enclaves/economies and their implications for immigrant 
welfare.  Original formulations of the enclave outlined it as an ill-defined spatial concentration 
which bounded the existence of immigrant economic, social, and cultural life, providing the 
necessary support for newcomers to progress economically (e.g. Wilson and Portes 1980, Portes 
1981, Portes and Manning 1986).  As such, the enclave hypothesis is a provocative assertion 
that immigrant segregation from the mainstream (no matter how defined) improves their 
socioeconomic position.  From the beginning, the appropriate space in which to assess this   5
concentration (e.g. combinations of census tracts, whole cities, metropolitan area) and whether 
it referred to place of residence, work or both, has never been clear (c.f. Sanders and Nee 1987; 
Portes and Jensen 1987; Zhou and Logan 1989).   In exasperation at this analytical morass, 
some scholars rejected the idea that ethnic enclaves could, or should, be spatially bounded and 
pushed for investigations of ethnic networks and industrial concentrations under the rubric of 
ethnic economies (e.g. Light 1994, Waldinger 1993).  But empirical studies which adopt this 
focus most often bound their investigations of ethnic economies within individual metropolitan 
areas, thereby delimiting an appropriate spatial scale of analysis implicitly.   
Unlike ethnic enclave research, the study of immigrant residential geography has been 
investigated mostly at the intra-urban scale, building largely on the frameworks emanating from 
spatial assimilation theory.  As articulated by Massey(1985), spatial assimilation theory posits 
that cultural adaptation and socioeconomic advancement by immigrants would propel their 
moves from highly-concentrated central city enclave locations to less ethnically-isolated 
suburbs. As a result of this relocation, they would experience further acculturation and gain 
further opportunities for the structural assimilation of their children, mainly through proximity 
to the US-born.  In this classical framework, spatial assimilation is very much a local process.  
Accordingly, most empirical investigations of spatial assimilation theory analyze immigrant 
residential mobility across intra-urban census tracts (e.g. Alba et. al. 1999, Alba Logan and 
Stults 2000, Logan, Alba, and Leung 1996, Logan, Alba and Zhang 2002), but some use the 
larger public-use microdata areas to take advantage of individual microdata (Allen and Turner 
1996).   
The formulaic representation of immigrants who initially reside in concentrated 
neighborhoods of co-ethnics and disperse as they integrate into “American” social space has 
often translated, unfortunately, into measurement of immigrant residential distance from US   6
whites, as if that were some singularly “American” reference group with singularly “American” 
residential patterns unmarked by earlier immigration experience, or by histories of race, class 
and their making in place (Wright and Ellis 2000, Wright, Ellis and Parks 2005, but see Logan 
2005 for an alternative view).  In the sense that theory creates normative expectations, the idea 
of spatial assimilation underpins jeremiads about immigrants whose mobility and residence do 
not follow theorized expectations of ethnic deconcentration.   
At least three perspectives offer alternatives to such a pernicious interpretation of 
immigrant socio-spatial behavior.  First, segmented assimilation theory emphasizes the 
constraints that make it difficult for those at the bottom of the racial hierarchy to translate 
socioeconomic gains into less segregated housing outcomes (see, for example, Alba, Logan, and 
Leung 1994, Rosenbaum and Friedman 2001).  Second, Zelinsky and Lee’s (1998) 
heterolocalism, which suggests that immigrant ethnic bonds can remain strong even in dispersed 
residential patterns, disrupts the simple linear association between neighborhood geography and 
assimilation at the heart of spatial assimilation theory.  And third, many immigrants now move 
directly to suburban locations, bypassing the stereotypical central city enclave to cluster, at least 
in some instances, in prosperous middle-class ethnoburbs (e.g. Li, 1998).  
Neighborhood scale research on race and ethnicity has a long pedigree in US social science 
dating back to the genesis of the Chicago School in the 1920s.  This helps explain why most 
contemporary research on the connections between space and immigrant incorporation occur at 
the intra-urban scale.  Yet there are other equally important spatial scales at which to observe 
immigrant adjustment to host society which get less attention from scholars. For example, the 
rate of mixed partnership formation between immigrants and non-co-nationals is a measure of 
immigrant spatial incorporation within households, even though most literature on out-
partnering does not treat the household as a spatial scale in the same ontological manner as   7
spatial assimilation theory treats neighborhoods (e.g. Bossard 1939, Kalmijn 1993, Alba 1995, 
Bean and Stevens 2003; but compare White and Sassler 2000, Ellis and Wright 2005, Ellis, 
Wright and Parks 2005).  There is also a small but growing research tradition connecting 
assimilation and space at metropolitan and state scales through analyses of immigrant location 
and subsequent internal migration (e.g. Bartel 1989, Kritz and Nogle 1994, Chiswick and Miller 
2004).  Bartel (1989: 387-88), for instance, hypothesizes that immigrants should move to cities 
with smaller percentages of co-ethnics as they assimilate.   
In recent papers, Frey and Liaw (2005a, 2000b) are even more explicit about the 
connection between assimilation and immigrant internal migration.  They argue that immigrant 
gains in human capital gains should generate migration to states and localities where fewer co-
ethnics live.  On initial inspection, this scale-jumping extension of spatial assimilation theory to 
immigrant internal migration, which is how Frey and Liaw label their approach, seems benign in 
its implications.  But, as in the case of its original intra-urban formulation, the spatial 
assimilation framework may lead to simplistic judgments of an immigrant group’s assimilative 
progress based on the extent of their migration-led dispersion from ethnic concentrations.  
Prominent immigration skeptics certainly take the view that dispersion through internal 
migration is a barometer of a group’s willingness to shed the bonds of ethnic attachment and 
assimilate into American life (e.g. Kennedy 1996, Huntington 2004).   
As in the intra-urban case, a segmented assimilation perspective offers a useful corrective 
to this questionable interstate dispersion-as-assimilation logic by highlighting the enduring 
importance of own-group association, especially for those unfavorable racialized in US society. 
If we accept segmented assimilation’s premise, today’s non-European immigrants and their 
descendents are unlikely to stray far from regions where their ethnic resources are strong and 
which they perceive to be tolerant.  Somewhat ironically, research on the settlement geography   8
of earlier European immigrant groups and their descendents is consistent with this idea.  For 
example, Lieberson and Waters (1987) found locational persistence through the twentieth 
century in the regional geographies of groups who mostly had arrived in the US by the turn of 
the twentieth century or earlier.   
Such persistence is also evident among the first generation of today’s immigrants whose 
inter-state out-migration propensity is lowest from states where immigrants concentrate (Kritz 
and Nogle 1994).  There is no information, however, about the migration behavior of the adult 
children of these immigrants.  Spatial logics derived from assimilation theory, such as those 
articulated by Bartel (1989)and Frey and Liaw (2005), implies that these later generations will 
disperse from first generation sites of concentrated immigrant settlement.  In this view, the US-
born children of immigrants, or immigrants who arrived as young children, should have 
considerably more experience in the US and exposure to a US educational system than the 
foreign-born who arrived in adolescence or older.  Consequently, the immediate descendents of 
today’s immigrants should have less need of the social capital found in ethnic concentrations to 
make their way in the world.  Moreover, with their qualifications and socialization to US norms, 
they should have greater access and attraction to opportunities wherever they exist in the US.  
Alternatively, segmented assimilation suggests that ethnic networks and persistent racialization 
may continue to play an important part in limiting the mobility of immigrants and their 
descendents.  
If historical experience is any guide, predictions of dispersal by the descendents of today’s 
immigrants are unlikely to be borne out.  For example, an investigation into the characteristics 
of the immigrant population and its descendents based on 1920 census data noted “an 
indisposition on the part of this second generation to travel very far from their foreign-born 
parents and kinsmen” (Carpenter (1927: 43).  In light of the distinctive racial and ethnic   9
composition of contemporary immigrant populations, and in recognition of the the responses 
predicted by segmented assimilation theory, it seems improbable that the descendents of 
contemporary immigrants will leave present states of immigrant concentration in significant 
numbers.  The remainder of this paper is dedicated to investigating this expectation empirically 
through an analysis of the interstate migration propensities of three distinct adult groups: 
foreign-born, US-born and the 1.5 generation. 
 
 Data and Preliminary Analysis 
The preceding discussion raised uncertainty about the possibility that the adult children of 
immigrants will disperse away from immigrant concentrations.  The problem with investigating 
this question empirically is the inability to identify 2
nd or later generations from the large 
sample data sets needed for migration research.  It is possible to identify the 2
nd generation 
proper from CPS data on parental birthplace, but these data provide inadequate sample sizes for 
our multivariate analysis.  The identification of the 1.5 generation in the 5% 2000 PUMS data 
affords a suitable proxy, with a significantly larger sample size that makes it possible to 
consider the effect of numerous covariates, such as race, and generates a longer 5-year (rather 
than 1-year in the CPS) migration question.  We differentiate the 1.5-generation population 
from the remainder of the foreign-born population by age at arrival:  following Perlmann and 
Waldinger (1997) and the work of Ruben Rumbaut we define the 1.5 group as immigrants who 
entered the US before they were ten years of age.  The foreign-born as we define them are thus 
those immigrants who arrived later in life.   
To start, we examine state variation in the percentage foreign-born and 1.5 generation 
(Figure 1).  The states are ranked by the sum of these percentage shares .The distributions of   10
percent foreign-born and 1.5 generation are highly correlated (r=0.86), which is not surprising 
given that many of the 1.5 generation reside in the homes of their immigrant parents.  
Next, we examine the raw inter-state five-year mobility rates of immigrants, the 1.5 
generation, and US-born adults from the 2000 PUMS.
1  Overall, 1.5 generation adults are more 
likely to undertake inter-state moves between 1995 and 2000 than either US-born or foreign-
born adults. We are particularly interested, especially given the literature on the negative 
relationship identified between nativity concentration and internal migration, in the importance 
of initial residence in a state with a high concentration of immigrants.  States designated as 
immigrant concentrations have both high percentages of immigrants and large populations and 
include California, Texas, New York, New Jersey, and Florida (this definition excludes Hawaii 
and Nevada – two states with high percentages of immigrants but small populations).  
Figure 2 shows that the foreign-born and the 1.5 generation are much more likely to move 
out of state if their origin state does not have a high concentration of immigrants.  While 
immigrant, 1.5 generation, and US-born individuals all have similar rates of out-migration from 
immigrant states, the foreign-born and 1.5 generation population have much higher mobility 
rates from states without significant immigrant concentrations.  Specifically, living in an 
immigrant state reduces the probability of migration for the 1.5 generation by nearly half, a 
slightly greater proportional reduction than for the foreign-born.  Overall, these descriptive 
results cast doubt on expectations of dispersion by the adult children of immigrants. 
 
Models 
                                                 
1 Foreign-born and second generation individuals have at least one foreign-born parent.  Individuals in these nativity 
group comparisons are at least 18 years of age.  As in our models in the next section, individuals residing in Alaska, 
Hawaii, and the District of Columbia are excluded from this analysis.   11
To compare these migration rates more effectively requires standardization of group 
differences by appropriate control variables.  Accordingly, we estimated a series of binary 
logistic regressions to compare interstate mobility rates among the US-born, foreign-born, and 
the 1.5 generation using the five percent sample of the 2000 PUMS.  To reiterate, our foreign-
born category is differentiated from the 1.5 generation category in that the latter arrived in the 
US prior to their 10
th birthday.   
Two sets of models are estimated: an initial set comparing foreign-born and 1.5 generation 
individuals in which foreign-born Hispanics are the reference category, and a second set 
comparing US-born and 1.5 generation individuals in which US-born whites are the reference 
category.  This allows us, in the first instance, to answer questions of mobility and the 
importance of ethnic concentration therein for the 1.5 generation relative to foreign-born 
Hispanics, the group it seems that much current debate takes as its concern, especially with 
regard to questions of geographic concentration.  In the second instance we compare the 1.5 
generation with US-born whites, the largest US-born group, to see whether there exist residual 
differences in mobility between these two populations.   
This two pronged modeling strategy allows us to measure as clearly as possible 
differences between the migration behavior of the 1.5 generation and a reference group that is 
either foreign-born or US-born. We rejected an alternative modeling strategy that relies on a 
single three group model because this procedure allows only one reference group and greatly 
increases the number of interaction effects needed to replicate the two group model 
specifications, substantially complicating interpretation.  For all models, the sample includes 
heads of household at least 23 years of age in 2000 (18 at the start of the risk period for a 
move), who are not on active-duty military service or living in group quarters.  The dependent 
variable in all models is whether or not an individual made an inter-state move between 1995   12
and 2000.   All specifications include covariates measuring race/ethnicity (coded Hispanic, 
white, black, Asian, and other)
2, age (in decadal cohorts), completed education,
3 number of 
persons in the family, and dummy indicators for marital status, gender, and self-employment.  
Each set of the two group models is a sequence of five logit specifications that add additional 
groups of covariates and interactions. 
We chose race and ethnic categories rather than national origin to differentiate groups for 
two reasons.  First, racial and ethnic categories allow us to group diverse national origin 
populations that concentrate in particular states into a small number of standardized groups.  Of 
course, this standardization glosses over considerable national origin variability within racial 
and ethnic categories across regions.  For example, Hispanic populations in Florida, New York, 
and California are quite distinct in national origin composition and social position, although the 
rapid growth of the Mexican population in east coast cities is slowly reducing these regional 
differences.  Our second rationale has to do with the external racialization process that 
immigrants and especially their children experience within the US.  Newcomers slot into 
America’s ethnic and racial hierarchy so that in many walks of social life their labeling and 
treatment by others will be significantly captured by these racial and ethnic groupings.  While 
we do not have precise expectations for the migration patterns of specific racial or ethnic 
groups, race and ethnicity have been so consistently important in the geography of immigrant 
and second generation settlement that it is reasonable to expect this will continue to be the case 
(Lieberson and Waters 1987).   
                                                 
2 We used a simple cross-walk scheme to collapse multiracial race categories into single race groups.  Those who 
reported as black/white were categorized as black, and Asian/white as Asian.  Hispanics are anyone responding to the 
Hispanic ethnicity variable. Other includes those not reporting as Hispanic, black, Asian or white, or reporting multiple 
races other than black/white and Asian/white.   
3 Less than high school, high school diploma or GED, some college, or at least a bachelor’s degree are the four 
categories here.   13
The basic 1.5 generation/foreign-born model also include a dummy variable for recent 
(1990 or later) arrivals among the foreign-born.  This cohort variable only operates on the 
foreign-born population because the sample’s age requirements exclude the possibility that any 
of the 1.5 generation will be in the recent arrival cohorts: all members of the 1.5 generation in 
the 2000 Census arrived before 1987, most before 1980.  
The first logit specification includes the basic covariates just described.  Models 2-5 add 
an immigrant origin concentration variable, which is a logged continuous measure of the 
proportion of the origin state that is foreign-born.
4  This concentration variable is interacted 
with 1.5 generation status in order to examine the differential effect of concentration on 
mobility for the 1.5 generation.  Model 3 introduces variables measuring origin state 
employment conditions, including percentage employment growth and manufacturing jobs as a 
share of all employment.
5  Much of the new employment over this period would have been in 
the burgeoning service sector, and we did not include a service jobs as percent of employment 
as this indicator would partially replicate the employment growth effect.  As such, we have 
controlled in these models for both an “old economy” historically immigrant sector 
(manufacturing) and newer job growth. We also tested variables for origin unemployment, and 
various housing affordability measures but these were insignificant.  Models 4-5 include 2-way 
interactions of race/concentration, education/concentration, and nativity/race, and 3-way 
interactions of nativity/race/concentration as covariates.
6  Descriptive statistics on key 
covariates for the US-born, foreign-born and the 1.5 generation are shown in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
4 Values of less than 1% are rounded up to 1. 
5 State employment growth is averaged over five years from 1990-95 in order to be exogenous to migration.  The 
percent of jobs in manufacturing is from 1995.  These variables are mean-centered, and the persons in family variable is 
centered at 1, so as to facilitate interpretation of coefficients. 
6 3-way interactions including education were tested and found to be insignificant and so not included in the final 
models presented here.   14
Foreign-born/1.5 Generation Models  
Results from the models comparing the 1.5 generation with immigrants who arrived later 
in life (referred to throughout this section as foreign-born) are reported in Table 2.  We show 
five logit specifications illustrating the effects of additional main and interaction effects. In the 
reduced model 1, we can see that the 1.5 generation is significantly more likely to undertake an 
inter-state move than immigrants who arrived as adults (about 6% more likely).  Other 
covariates display expected relationships, such that interstate migration declines with age and 
household size, increases with education, and is less likely for women and the self-employed.  
  
The crux of our analysis is the origin state foreign-born concentration variable (logcon) 
introduced in model 2.  After controlling for the individual-level variables in the reduced model 
1, concentration has significant negative effects, such that increasing immigrant concentration at 
origin deters out-migration. These effects are even more pronounced for the 1.5 generation than 
for the immigrants who arrived as adults (the reference category), as indicated by the coefficient 
on the 1.5con interaction term. Moreover, with these two variables included, the size of the 1.5 
generation main effect increases considerably from model 1, meaning that 1.5 generation 
interstate mobility is much higher from states with the lowest concentrations of immigrants than 
from states with high percentages of immigrants.  This confirms earlier speculations that the 1.5 
generation are more likely to stay put in the states in which their parents generation settled.   
The inclusion of state-level employment growth and percent manufacturing employment 
has minimal impact on the main effect for concentration, indicating that the negative effects of 
concentration on mobility are robust to origin economic conditions.  However, while the 1.5 
generation effects (main and interacting with concentration) maintain sign and magnitude in 
model 3, they are no longer significant, partly because in this and subsequent models standard   15
errors are clustered on origin state to account for the state measurement of economic conditions.  
Thus, our major findings from models 1-3 are: 1) that concentration at origin significantly 
deters out-migration, and more so for the 1.5 generation than for immigrants who arrived as 
adults, and 2) that this effect is robust to the inclusion of state-level economic indicators and 
individual demographic variables such as age and education.   
Model 4 begins to explore how these immigrant concentration effects vary by racial group 
and educational status through the addition of second-order interactions of race and education 
with concentration.  Concentration has no differential effect on white or black migration 
propensity relative to the Hispanic reference category, but it does reduce the migration rate for 
Asians.  The interactions between immigrant concentration and education are stronger, showing 
that concentration reduces the probability of an interstate move for the most educated.  
Admittedly, these negative interactions are insufficient to cancel out the positive main effects of 
education; thus the highly educated still remain the most mobile group at all levels of immigrant 
concentration. Nevertheless, the cumulative impact of these education effects generates a 
smaller variance in interstate mobility rates by education in states with the highest concentration 
of immigrants.  Model 4 also includes interactions between 1.5 generation status and race, 
which show that 1.5 generation blacks and Asians are more mobile than their foreign-born 
counterparts.   
Model 5 unpacks the effects of immigrant concentration on the mobility of the 1.5 
generation by group with three way interactions.  As this interaction gets closest to the issue at 
the heart of this paper, and as it is our richest specification, we devote most of our comments to 
the parameter estimates from this final model.  In general, considerations of origin 
concentration and its interactions with generational status in this model substantially undermine 
the idea of 1.5 generation dispersal.  This statement may seem surprising after glancing at the   16
main effect of 1.5 generation status, for this coefficient is considerably more positive in model 5 
than in the previous four specifications.  However, the interaction between 1.5 generation and 
immigrant concentration is a good deal more negative than in the other models.  Thus at high 
values of immigrant concentration the interstate mobility of the 1.5 generation is considerably 
lower than for the foreign-born reference category.   
The mixture of two and three-way interactions in model 5 makes it hard to discern group 
differences in the relationship between concentration and mobility.  Cumulating all relevant 
main and interaction effects at a range of levels of immigrant concentration and charting the 
resulting probabilities of interstate mobility is much better for this purpose.  Figure 3 reports 
such probabilities calculated with values of most of the independent variables held constant at 
the reference category or mean, allowing only 1.5 generation/foreign-born status, race, and 
concentration to vary.  As such, Figure 3 charts estimates of the interstate migration probability 
for single, high-school educated, men in their thirties who are not self employed.
7   Although 
our concentration variable is continuous, the probabilities in this figure are calculated at state-
level concentrations that follow the actual distribution of these values in 2000: California is 
18% foreign-born, NY is 15% foreign-born, and the other states previously specified as 
immigrant states TX, FL, and NJ, also AZ and NV) range from 9-12% foreign-born.   
We can see that living in a state immigrant concentration reduces the propensity to 
migrate across state lines for the 1.5 generation and foreign-born in all groups.  In fact, the 1.5 
generation have an extraordinarily high propensity to leave states with extremely low 
concentrations of immigrants.  Indeed, for 1.5 generation Hispanics, blacks, and Asians (and 
                                                 
7 By simply replacing coefficients, we could have examined, for example, married self-employed women in their 
fifties. These reference categories were chosen for illustrative purposes so as to compare the most-mobile prime 
working-age population.  Since gender and marital status have negative effects on migration in our models these 
probabilities would be about 15-25% lower for similar married women.  Figure 4 compares similar men with a 
bachelors degree in order to illustrate the effects of education.   17
foreign-born Asians) in origin states that are 1% immigrant (zero log concentration), the 
probabilities of migration range between .25 and .4.  At higher levels of concentration, 1.5 
generation Asians and blacks and their foreign-born counterparts share equally low out-
migration rates; and 1.5 generation Hispanics actually become less likely to move than their 
foreign-born co-ethnics.  Keep in mind that these charts compare migration probabilities for the 
1.5 generation relative to immigrants who arrived as adults before 1990. When compared to 
adult immigrants who arrived after 1990, the relative immobility of 1.5 generation Hispanics 
becomes even more pronounced in states with high percentages of immigrants.  
Figure 4 charts probabilities of interstate mobility under the same conditions as in Figure 3 
but for those with a bachelors degree instead of a high school diploma.   As already noted, the 
main effects of education indicate an unsurprising result: those with more years in school are 
more likely to move; but the interactions of education with immigrant concentration moderate 
this difference.  Figure 4 reveals how much these combined effects influence interstate mobility 
rates at various levels of immigrant concentration for the 1.5 generation and foreign-born with a 
bachelors degree.  A comparison of Figure 4 with Figure 3 shows that, for all groups, both the 
1.5 generation and the foreign-born with a BA degree have higher interstate mobility than the 
equivalent with a high school education.  But just as for those with a high-school education, 
interstate migration rates for foreign-born and 1.5 generation BA recipients are lowest from the 
highest immigrant concentrations.  Further, the retaining effect of concentration appears 
stronger for the 1.5 generation who have a BA degree than those with a high school education, 
as evidenced by the steeper concentration gradients in this chart relative to Figure 3.  This 
suggests that the most-educated members of the 1.5 generation view states with high immigrant 
concentrations as providing the best (or most accessible or preferred) labor market 
opportunities, just as the 1.5 generation with a high school education do.   18
 
US-born/1.5 Generation Models 
The foreign-born/1.5 generation models suggest that members of these two groups are less 
mobile when resident in states with high immigrant concentrations.  This result holds even for 
those with the most education; thus it is unlikely that the socioeconomic advance of the 1.5 
generation will initiate their interstate dispersal.  However, these models do not answer the 
question of whether the migration response of the 1.5 generation to immigrant concentration 
differs from that of the US-born.  It may be that the outmigration response of the well-educated 
1.5 generation is no different than the behavior of the equivalently educated (and racialized) 
US-born who reside in states of immigrant concentration.  In this case, 1.5 generation dispersal 
is not only unlikely but also contrary to the assimilative convergence in migration behavior 
between the  descendents of immigrants and the US-born.  Accordingly, the next set of models 
compare the interstate migration behavior of the 1.5 generation to the US-born, taking US-born 
whites as the reference category.  The models follow the same patterns of variable inclusion as 
the foreign-born/1.5 generation models discussed above.  As before, we are most interested in 
the coefficients of the fully-specified model 5, but there are useful insights to be gleaned from 
the sequenced introduction of variables in the preceding models  
Model 1’s basic specification shows no difference in migration propensity between the 1.5 
generation and the US-born.  This similarity masks significant differences between these two 
groups in the effect of immigrant concentration on migration rates.  For example, in model 2 the 
significant positive 1.5 generation coefficient indicates greater interstate mobility by the 1.5 
generation in states with a logged immigrant concentration value of zero (immigrant 
concentrations are 1% or less).  With increasing origin concentration, however, this migration   19
rate differential reverses: the mobility of the US-born rises slightly while that of the 1.5 
generation falls (see coefficients on logcon and 1.5con). 
Model 4 interrogates group and education differentials in the migration response to 
concentration through a series of two-way interactions.  In this model the main effects of race 
capture group differences in migration propensity at the lowest level of immigrant 
concentration.  Asians and Hispanics are extremely likely, relative to whites, to leave low 
concentration states.  With increasing immigrant concentration, however, the interactions of 
race and concentration show that the mobility of Hispanics and Asians diminishes considerably 
whereas that for whites increases (the latter measured by the logcon coefficient in the presence 
of interaction terms between race and concentration).  This does not necessarily mean that 
whites are more likely to leave high immigrant concentrations than Asians or Hispanics.  The 
only way to determine if this is the case is to calculate migration probabilities for these groups 
using realistic values of immigrant concentration – a task we turn to after the remaining 
discussion of the coefficients.  Model 4 also interacts education with immigrant concentration 
and, as in the foreign-born/1.5 generation models, the college educated are least likely to move 
from states with high immigrant concentrations.    
Model 5 introduces interactions to measure differences in the effect of immigrant 
concentration on migration for 1.5 generation race groups relative to their US-born counterparts.  
To disentangle these interaction effects more thoroughly and illustrate the effect of variable 
levels of immigrant concentration in the origin state on the mobility of the 1.5 generation and 
the US-born we calculated migration probabilities by race and nativity group, much as we did 
for the foreign-born/1.5 generation models (Figure 5).  Again, these probabilities are estimated 
for single, high-school educated, not self-employed men in their thirties; other variables are set   20
at their means.  The charts vary calculations using the same range of immigrant concentration as 
in the foreign-born/1.5 generation migration probabilities  
US-born whites and blacks look very similar in their response to immigrant concentration:  
the greater the proportion foreign-born in the origin, the higher the probability of undertaking an 
interstate move.  US-born Asians and Hispanics, however, react like their foreign-born 
counterparts in being less likely to move from states with high immigrant concentrations.  
Reactions to concentration also vary among 1.5 generation groups.  There appears to be a 
minimal effect of concentration on the migration propensity of 1.5 generation whites.  Black 1.5 
generation mobility diminishes when they are resident in high immigrant states.  This decline is 
even stronger for 1.5 generation Asians and Hispanics. 
  For Asians and Hispanics, then, the migration response of the 1.5 generation closely 
resembles that of their US-born co-ethnics; regardless of generation, both groups appear to be 
least mobile from states in which immigrants cluster.  The situation for 1.5 generation blacks 
and whites is more complicated because US-born members of their groups are larger and more 
distinctive from recent immigrants than is the case for Asians and Hispanics.   Most notable is 
the disjuncture between the reactions of 1.5 generation blacks and US-born blacks to low 
immigrant concentrations, although both share the same outmigration rate from the highest 
immigrant concentrations.  The difference between them at low immigrant concentrations may 
reflect their variable response to residence in the American south where US-born blacks are 
numerous and have a long residential association but immigrants, including foreign-born blacks, 
are thin on the ground.   
Figure 6 charts migration probabilities for the 1.5 generation/US-born with a BA degree.  
Unlike the results for high school graduates, these probabilities show consistent trends across all 
groups with outmigration probabilities diminishing as immigration concentration rises.   At low   21
levels of immigrant concentration, 1.5 generation whites, blacks, Hispanics are more mobile 
than their US-born counterparts.  But at the highest levels of concentration, outmigration rates 
are virtually uniform and low across all groups.  Thus for highly educated members of the 1.5 
generation, low rates of mobility from states with high immigrant concentrations conform to the 
migration behavior of the US-born in the equivalent race group.  As such, in terms of interstate 
mobility, it seems that the highly educated 1.5 generation have assimilated to the responses of 
their US-born equivalents but that this migration behavior is inconsistent with expectations of 





We began this paper by asking whether the descendents of today’s immigrants would 
disperse from states of immigration in their efforts to make their way in American society.  
Based on our investigation of the interstate migration behavior of the 1.5 generation, the answer 
to this question is probably not:  regardless of education, members of the 1.5 generation of all 
race groups appear to be least likely to undertake an interstate move when resident in a state 
with high concentrations of immigrants. 
At first blush, the 1.5 generation appear to following the pattern established by their 
parent’s generation in which concentrations of co-nationals or co-ethnics are either attractive 
from a cultural familiarity perspective, or because they provide pools of group-specific social 
capital.  That both the highly educated foreign-born and 1.5 generation are less likely to migrate 
when residing in immigrant state concentrations suggests that education will not diminish these   22
factors.  This reluctance is consistent with what Boyd (2000) calls a “rejection of education-
based mobility by immigrant offspring.”   
The comparisons between the US-born and 1.5 generation, however, tell a different story.   
For the high-school educated there is some disparity in the response to immigrant 
concentrations between US-born and 1.5 generation whites and blacks.  For those with a BA, 
however, the response across generations for all race groups is uniform: the lowest rates of out-
migration are from states with the highest concentrations of immigrants.  This calls into 
question the notion that the highly-educated 1.5 generation are cleaving to the locations in 
which their parents settled for reasons of cultural familiarity or access to group specific capital 
alone.  For if the highly-educated US-born who reside in the same places are reacting the same 
way, it suggests that states with high concentrations of immigrants have the sorts of job 
opportunities, or access to jobs, that make it attractive for them to stay.   Consequently, regional 
persistence by the descendents of today’s immigrant populations is likely, much as it was for the 
descendents of the previous wave of immigration a century ago (Lieberson and Waters 1988).     
One consequence of this persistence is that it is probable that the regions in which today’s 
1.5 and 2
nd  generations are coming of age will also be where they will be employed for most, if 
not all, of their working lives.  From a supply-side perspective, the labor market careers of these 
immigrant descendents will depend, in part, on their educational achievements and skills 
acquisition.  But local demand conditions will also matter a great deal, as the job successes of 
the 1.5 and 2
nd generation will hinge on the structure and fortunes of the regional economies in 
which they remain, and on the receptivity of local employers to them.  These are uncertain 
processes whose outcomes will only reveal themselves with time and careful analysis.  Existing 
research on immigrant and ethnic economies, however, suggests some useful questions to begin 
these investigations.  These include whether ethnic job niching and rates of entrepreneurialism   23
will persist across generations, and if and how the shape and ranking of ethnic and job queues 
will change as the 1.5 and 2
nd generation make up an increasing fraction of local labor supply 
(see Light and Bonacich 1988, Waldinger 1996).    
On its face, the similarity in interstate migration behavior between the 1.5 generation and 
the US-born should help reduce anxiety about the assimilability of today’s immigrants and their 
descendents.  But although these convergent migration behaviors are a clear sign of immigrant 
adjustment to US society they are at odds with the prevailing logic of the spatial dispersion-as 
assimilation model because they imply sustained regional immigrant concentrations.  This logic 
will be hard to disrupt because its origins are deeply rooted in a common social scientific 
epistemological practice: the tendency to read off social relations directly from spatial patterns.  
Moreover, those who perceive regional concentrations of immigrants as worrisome for future 
national coherence are unlikely to be cheered by the similar migration responses of the 1.5 
generation and the US-born in those concentrations.  In the British context, Vron Ware (2001) 
has argued that the challenge posed by uneven ethnic geographies is to get people to accept the 
idea that the nation is multiethnic no matter the local composition of the population.  Given that 
internal migration is unlikely to even out immigration’s mark on the US ethnic landscape, and 
in light of the anxieties this geography invokes, this substantial challenge also confronts the US. 
Finally, the analysis in this paper only investigates half of the migration story: the 
propensity to move.  It is still unknown where the 1.5 generation moves to and whether their 
destination choices favor immigrant concentrations.  If their moves are primarily to these 
clusters then their concentration will intensify even further over time in a handful of immigrant 
rich states.  As with the out-migration models, this concentration through migration may not just 
be distinctive to the 1.5 generation but also replicated in the pattern of origin-destination flows 
of the US-born, especially by the highly educated.  The next step is to analyze these flows with   24
destination choice models, comparing the choices of the 1.5 generation to the US-born and 
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Table 1: Summary of Covariates by Nativity        
            
            
  US-born Foreign-born  1.5  Generation       
N  895,788  85,550  11,697       
%  90.2%  8.60%  1.20%       
             
Race %             
   White  83  43  45         
   Hispanic  4  26  36         
   Black  11  7  4         
   Asian  1  3  3         
   Other  2  3  3         
             
Age %             
   20s  9  8  20         
   30s  20  25  31         
   40s  23  25  21         
   50s  18  18  12         
   60s  13  12  3         
   70s  18  12  13         
             
Education %             
   < High School  17  41  20         
   High School  30  18  21         
   Some College  22  13  22         
   BA+  31  29  37         
             
Other Variables             
   Self-Employed %  10  12  10         
   Married %  55  65  56         
   Female %  34  29  35         
   Persons (Mean)  1.4  1.8  2.3         
             
% in Concentrated State*  30  64  58         
             
Interstate Migration Rate 
   from concentrated state*  7.4  7.4  7.7   
   from other state  7.6  11.6  13.8     
  
              
* includes CA, NY, NJ, FL, TX,.  This is for summary purposes only, and is not used in the logit models.   37
Table 2. Foreign-born/1.5 Generation Logit Models of Interstate Migration, 1995-2000 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
      
1.5 Generation  .0596519***    .135646***  .1294039  -.0705726   .6745257***   
      
Race (reference= Hispanic) 
White  .1737513***   .0473708***  .0080595  -.0518349   .1254699 
Black  .1578904***   .1033927***  .0505208   .0025205   .1007695 
Asian  .4512072***   .3885945***  .3609741***   .7718573***   .8927288*** 
Other   .470602***   .4156859***  .3778119***   .7403262***   .8373925*** 
      
Age Cohort (reference= 30s) 
20s   .3175186***   .2980921***   .3023292***   .2945175***   .2955541*** 
40s  -.5381307***  -.5348387***   -.535893*** -.5226269*** -.5230886*** 
50s  -1.012665***  -1.014946*** -1.018569*** -1.006851*** -1.006759*** 
60s  -1.118903***    -1.11579*** -1.120602*** -1.111032*** -1.111406*** 
70s  -1.367431***  -1.366017*** -1.369351*** -1.341499*** -1.341661*** 
      
Education (reference= HS Diploma) 
< hs  -.0487605***  -.0453347** -.0336865  -.2730096***  -.2432639*** 
College   .1188642***   .1344814***   .1459885*   .4919545***   .4806174*** 
BA+   .6516897***   .6349712***    .639137***   1.271179***   1.260079*** 
      
Other Variables 
Self-Employed  -.3605071***  -.3428032*** -.3391784*** -.3390579*** -.3391887*** 
Married   .0066384  -.0088566 -.0101778 -.0124462 -.0123158 
Female   -.1695624***  -.1449321*** -.1508149*** -.1527836*** -.1535466*** 
# persons in hhold  -.1315756***  -.1221465*** -.1219458*** -.1218387***     -.12177*** 
90s arrival   .3488986***   .3075828***  .3061859***   .3160688***   .3180376***  
      
Origin Variables 
Logcon     -.40138***  -.4324828***   -.2104582***   -.164238** 
1.5.con   -.0490389*** -.0442873    -.0194654  -.3477179*** 
Empchange     -.0173618**    -.015499  -.0154306** 
% manufacturing     -.4983916    -.6813079**  -.6844742 
      
2nd-order race.concentration.interactions 
White.con         .0466545  -.0356249 
Black.con         .0112994  -.0307192 
Asian.con         -.208231**   -.261525*** 
Other.con       -.1905019**  -.2320505*** 
       
2nd-order education.concentration interactions 
<HS.con         .0978931***   .0843786*** 
College.con       -.1623033**  -.1572798*** 
BA.con       -.3141376***  -.3093113*** 
       
2
nd-order 1.5 generation.race interactions 
1.5.White         .1100905  -.9304038*** 
1.5.Black         .3187903***  -.3255962 
1.5.Asian         .3503555***  -.4696855*** 
1.5.Other          .503398***   -.157054 
      
3
rd-order 1.5 generation.race.concentration interactions 
1.5.White.con        .4872738*** 
1.5.Black.con        .2810487*** 
1.5.Asian.con        .3658603*** 
1.5.Other.con        .2867858*** 
      
Constant  -1.959868***  -1.045523***  -.979295***    -1.45198***   -1.558546*** 
 
* p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01   38
Table 3. US-born/1.5 Generation Logit Models of Interstate Migration, 1995-2000 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
      
1.5 Generation  -.1084677  .9813337*** .9467308***   .31447***   .5013234*** 
      
Race (reference= White) 
Hispanic  -.2145833***  -.2353379*** -.2482415*  .8748676***   .8811072*** 
Black  -.2013799***  -.2009689*** -.2047288*** -.153596** -.1550762  ** 
Asian   .3421665***   .3196499***   .3376508  1.681314***   1.863359*** 
Other   .4817465***   .4755689***   .4661008***  .6946748***   .6839764*** 
      
Age Cohort (reference= 30s) 
20s   .5304554***   .5362887***    .535464***   .5302907***   .5303057*** 
40s   -.601851***  -.6028148*** -.6023658*** -.6023232*** -.6024264*** 
50s  -.8957603***  -.8976007*** -.8975725*** -.8976187*** -.8977484*** 
60s  -.9267828***   -.929212***  -.9288065***   -.930464***  -.9305598*** 
70s  -1.327624***  -1.332867*** -1.331437*** -1.343017***   -1.34312*** 
      
Education (reference= HS Diploma) 
< HS  -.1073609***  -.1035471*** -.1065131*** -.1318376** -.1315131** 
College   .4052841***   .3973532***   .3930028***   .6573508***   .6571282*** 
BA+   .9017325***   .8905986***   .8896476***   1.418507***   1.418238*** 
      
Other Variables      
Self-Employed  -.4253146***  -.4272307*** -.4275826***   -.42314***  -.4230711*** 
Married   .0186823***   .0217397***   .0197272   .0223549   .0224067 
Female   -.1244014***  -.1254112*** -.1232799*** -.1247187*** -.1247094*** 
# persons in hhold  -.1180052***   -.117566***  -.1178748***  -.1192422***   -.119252*** 
      
Origin Variables 
Logcon    .0481467***   .0570917*   .2773517***   .2778868*** 
1.5.con   -.481298*** -.4604138***  -.1675394*** -.2661558*** 
Empchange       .010611**   .0096534*   .0096216* 
% manufacturing     -.5421331  -.3685828 -.3669636 
      
2nd-order race.concentration.interactions 
Hisp.con     -.5612732*** -.5645015*** 
Black.con     -.0376323 -.0366507 
Asian.con     -.6319879*** -.7235271*** 
Other.con     -.1480317** -.1413068* 
      
2nd-order education.concentration interactions 
<HS.con      .0221714   .0219958 
College.con     -.1802401*** -.1801307*** 
BA.con     -.3488874*** -.3487475*** 
      
2nd-order 1.5 generation.race interactions 
1.5.Hisp     .0510559 -.1887711 
1.5.Black     .3186858***    .612174*** 
1.5.Asian     .0039775 -.7403855*** 
1.5.Other      .201944**   .7267341*** 
      
3rd-order 1.5 generation.race.concentration  interactions 
1.5.Hisp.con          .122797 
1.5.Black.con        -.1241049 
1.5.Asian.con         .3784466*** 
1.5.Other.con        -.2469316* 
      
Constant  -2.036241***  -2.104456*** -2.11797***  -2.43644***  -2.437172***   
 
* p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01   39
 


















































































































Figure 3 – Probabilities of Interstate Migration for the High School-Educated by Foreign-Born 













































Figure 4 - Probabilities of Inter-State Mobility for BA Recipients by Foreign-Born 












































Figure 5 – Probabilities of Interstate Migration for the High School-Educated 














































Figure 6 - Probabilities of Inter-State Mobility for BA Recipients  by Foreign-Born 
Concentration: US-Born/1.5 Generation Models 
 